How CIA Overthrew Iranian Gov't in 1953

It has now been 51 years since a U.S. coup on Aug. 19, 1953, overthrew
a democratically elected prime minister in Iran and brought the
despised dictator, the Shah, back to power to rule with absolute despotism for
another 26 years.

Four years ago the New York Times obtained a copy of the
still-classified CIA secret history of that coup. That history, according to a Times
article by James Risen published on April 16, 2000, and available on
the Web (search Google for New York Times Special Report: The C.I.A. in
Iran), reveals the inner workings of a plot that set the stage for the
Islamic Revolution 26 years later and for a generation of anti-U.S.
hatred in one of the Middle East's most powerful countries.

The document discloses how the United States, in order to gain control
over Iran's oil and expand its dominance in the region, plotted and
executed the coup in collaboration with Britain. The CIA has refused to
make some files public, claiming they were destroyed in early 1960s.

This was the first successful regime change by the United States.
Washington was to carry out many more. The next one came the following year
in Guatemala.

A short history

Restive under decades of British colonial domination, nationalism had
grown among the Iranian people. In 1951, Iran's parliament voted to
nationalize the oil industry. Legislators backing the law elected its
leading advocate, Dr. Moham med Mossadegh, as prime minister.

Britain responded with threats and sanctions. Prime Minister Mossadegh
refused to back down. So British intelligence officials proposed a
joint plan to oust him to their U.S. counterparts.

The newly inaugurated Eisenhower administration became especially
interested when it learned that the Iranian communist party--the Tudeh
Party--was strong, active and growing in popularity.

CIA Director Allen W. Dulles approved $1 million to be used "in any way
that would bring about the fall of Mossadegh. The aim was to bring to
power a government which would reach an equitable oil settlement ... and
which would vigorously prosecute the dangerously strong communist
party."

Within days, agency officials identified a high-ranking officer, Gen.
Fazlollah Zahedi, as the person to spearhead a coup. Their plan called
for the shah to play a leading role. But the young shah wanted to
continue his kingdom and was afraid of losing his throne if he went against
the wishes of the people and the parliament, so he was very reluctant to
go along. He was to be pressured and threatened to participate in the
coup.

According to the document obtained by the Times, CIA officials began
planting anti-Mossadegh articles in the local press. The coup began on
the night of Aug. 15. At first, it did not succeed and General Za hedi,
who was to replace Dr. Mossadegh, fled.

But Kermit Roosevelt, the Middle East envoy at the time and grandson of
Theodore Roosevelt, tracked Zahedi down and convinced him that the coup
could still succeed if they could persuade the public that he was the
lawful prime minister. (Roosevelt, by the way, became a vice president
of Gulf Oil after he retired from the CIA in 1958.)

To accomplish that, they had to get out the news that the shah had
dismissed Mossadegh and appointed Zahedi. So the CIA station in Tehran sent
a message to the Associated Press in New York, asserting that
"unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed
with two decrees of the Shah, one dismissing Mossadegh and the other
appointing Zahedi to replace him." The CIA and its agents also arranged
for the decrees to be mentioned in some Tehran papers.

On Aug. 16, prospects for reviving the operation were dealt a seemingly
fatal blow when it was learned that the shah had fled to
Baghdad--because people were pouring into the streets when they learned of the coup.

People rioted in the streets for three days. They dismantled the
statues of the shah and his father.

The CIA gave up on the operation. But Roosevelt insisted that there was
still a chance for success if the shah would broadcast an address on
the Baghdad radio, and if Zahedi took an aggressive stand.

On the morning of Aug. 17, the shah finally announced from Baghdad that
he had signed the decrees.

Believing that the shah's departure and the arrests of some officers
involved in the coup had removed the danger, Dr. Mossadegh let his guard
down. The government recalled most troops it had stationed around the
city.

That night the CIA arranged for Zahedi and other army officers to be
smuggled into the embassy compound for a "council of war."

They agreed to start a counterattack on Aug. 19. Using travel papers
forged by the CIA, key army officers went to outlying army garrisons to
persuade commanders to join the coup. But once again, the shah
disappointed the CIA when he left Baghdad for Italy as his exile.

CIA forges 'iron hand'

On the morning of Aug. 19, several Tehran newspapers published the
shah's decrees. Soon pro-shah crowds were building in the streets.

"They needed only leadership," the secret history says. And Iranian
agents of the CIA provided it.

One of the agency's most important Iranian agents led a crowd toward
Parlia ment, inciting people to set fire to the offices of a newspaper
owned by Mossa degh's foreign minister.

Another Iranian CIA agent led a crowd to sack the offices of pro-Tudeh
news papers.

Iranians working for the CIA and posing as communists harassed
religious leaders and staged the bombing of one cleric's home in a campaign to
turn the country's Islamic religious community against Mossadegh's
government.

Sako Sefiani
More- http://www.workers.org/ww/2004/iran0902.php